The Death Penalty and Discretion: Implications of the Furman Decision for Criminal Justice by Riedel, Marc
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 3
Issue 6 July Article 5
July 1976
The Death Penalty and Discretion: Implications of
the Furman Decision for Criminal Justice
Marc Riedel
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Criminology Commons, and the Social Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Riedel, Marc (1976) "The Death Penalty and Discretion: Implications of the Furman Decision for Criminal Justice," The Journal of
Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 3 : Iss. 6 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol3/iss6/5
THE DEATH PENALTY AND DISCRETION:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FURMAN DECISION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Marc Riedel, Ph.D
Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law
University of Pennsylvania
INTRODUCTION
Whether the deatn penalty should remain as a penalty available in
American criminal law continues to be a subject of controversy among social
scientists, lawyers, the judiciary and the public. While the traditional
areas of debate over whether the death penalty is a deterrent and whether it
is imposed ina discriminatory manner continue to be important issues, the
recent Supreme Court decision (Furman v Georgia, 1972) and subsequent legisla-
tion has introduced another dimension: the nature and use of discretion.
Current litigation on the death penalty (Fowler v North Carolina, 1974)
is directed toward a resolution of issues raised by Furman. However, it is
our contention that the results of such efforts will raise a range of policy
questions regarding how discretion can be exercised not only in other parts
of the criminal justice process, but for non-death penalty offenses as well.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Furman decision and subsequent
legislation and show that the questions raised about discretionary decisions
are questions that are equally applicable to processing all criminal offenses.
FURMAN V. GEORGIA
In June 1972, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four decision, ruled that
"the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth
Amendments" (U.S. Reports, 1972:238). The three petitioners referred to in
the decision are black; one had been convicted of a felony murder, while
the other two had been convicted of rape.1
Because the concurring and dissenting justices filed separate opinions,
and none joined in the opinion of any other, the scope and consequences of
the Furman decision are not completely clear. However, the opinions of the
concurring Justices suggest that the death penalty constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment because it is imposed infrequently and under no clear stand-
ards. Justice Brennan, for example, concluded that procedures have not been
"constructed to guard against the totally capricious selection of criminals
for the punishment of death" (U.S. Reports, 1972:295). Justice White indi-
cated that the death penalty is imposed so infrequently that "the threat of
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice"
(U.S. Reports, 1972:313). Focusing on the lack of clear standards, Justice
Stewart simply concluded "that the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
1
The convictions and sentences were affirmed, Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253,
167 S. E. 2d 628 (1969); Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E. 2d 501
(1969); Branch v. State, T SW. 2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969).
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tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be wantonly and so freakishly imposed" (U.S.
Reports, 1972:310).
Justices Marshall and Douglas indicated that the lack of clear stand-
ards in jury sentencing may provide opportunities for the discriminatory
imposition of the death penalty. Giving juries "untrammeled discretion"
to impose a sentence of death, Justice Marshall concluded, was "an open
invitation to discrimination" (U.S. Reports, 1972:365). Commenting on the
opportunities for discrimination against minorities, the poor and powerless,
Justice Douglas states "thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitu-
tional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and dis-
crimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection
of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishment"
(U.S. Reports, 1972:256,257).
In addition to invalidating all the death penalty statutes that left
sentencing to the unfettered discretion of the judge or jury, the Furman
decision led to the reversal of 631 death sentences (Davis, 1974). In the
three years since the Furman decision, 34 state legislatures have enacted
new statutes authorizing the death penalty.
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION: "MANDATORY" AND "GUIDED DISCRETION" STATUTES
Although the Supreme Court apparently found standardless judge or jury
discretion in imposing the death penalty constitutionally impermissible, it
left open the question of what form of the death penalty, if any, was consti-
tutionally acceptable. The lack of clarity in the Furman decision is reflect-
ed in the thrity-four new statutes which purport to meet the constraints im-
posed by the Supreme Court decision; none of the new statutes is identical,
although differences among some of them are negligible (Salkin, 1974).
The new death penalty legislation has resulted in statutes that can be
divided into two broad categories; "mandatory" and "guided discretion".
"Mandatory" statutes prescribe the imposition of a death sentence upon con-
viction for certain usually narrowly defined crimes. Idaho, for example,
provides that every person found guilty of first degree murder shall suffer
death. First degree murder is defined as all premeditated murder, murder
of an on-duty law officer, or murder by a person already convicted of first
or second degree murder (Legal Defense Fund, 1973).
It is not clear if current statutes reviving mandatory death penalty sen-
tencing, which was abandoned by nearlyall the states in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries will meet constitutional objections. Historically, the
abandonment of mandatory sentencing occurred because it was believed to pro-
duce "jury nullification"--a refusal or lessened readiness by juries to con-
vict (Bowers, 1974). Such a possibility remains with new mandatory statutes-,
leading Chief Justice Burger to comment in dissent: "Real change could clear-
ly be brought about if legislatures provided mandatory death sentences in
such a way as to deny juries the opportunity to bring in a verdict on a lesser
charge. Under such a system, the death penalty could only be avoided by a
verdict of acquittal. If this is the only alternative that legislatures can
safely pursue under today's ruling, I would have preferred that the Court opt
for abolition" (U.S. Reports, 1972:401).
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Consideration like the above may have led legislatures to enact statutes
which attempt to guide discretion by providing a list of aggravating and some-
times mitigating circumstances to be used by the court in deciding whether
the death sentence is to be imposed. Except for the offenses of treason and
aircraft hijacking for which a mandatory death penalty is imposed, the Georgia
death penalty statute belongs among the "guided discretion" statutes. It
specifies that for the offenses of rape, murder, armed robbery and kidnapping,
the death sentence may be imposed by the trial judge or jury only if the sen-
tencer finds at least one aggravating circumstance (Salkin, 1974).
Using a bifurcated trial to decide separately the issues of guilt and
sentence, the statute specifies that at the pre-sentence hearing "the judge
shall consider or include in his instructions to the jury to consider, any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any
of the following aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the
evidence" (Salkin, 1974:17-18). For offenders convicted of rape, murder,
armed robbery or kidnapping, a partial list of aggravating circumstances
include a prior record of a capital felony, a substantial history of serious
assaultive criminal convictions, the murder of a judicial officer, district
attorney, solicitor, peace officer, corrections employee or fireman during
the course of their occupational duties, and the commission of rape, murder,
armed robbery or kidnapping in the course of committing another felony (Salkin,
1974).
It is somewhat difficult to understand how this statute is equitably
administered. While aggravating circumstances are listed, no mitigating
circumstances are provided. Further, even if the jury finds aggravating
circumstances, it is not compelled to make a "recommendation of death' (Legal
Defense Fund, 1973).
THE FURMAN DECISION AND SENTENCING
The most important observation drawn from the material is that inter-
pretations of the Furman decision do not center on discrimination against a
particular group; rather, the objection is to a sentencing procedure. The
basic objection is to a standardless discretionary sentencing decision, char-
acterized as having arbitrary and discriminatory results.
It would appear that there are important similarities between the discre-
tionary sentencing decisions objected to in Furman and the discretionary sen-
tencing decisions currently in use to impose a-variety of criminal sanctions.
For death penalty and non-death penalty cases the discretion of the sentencing
agent is only broadly constrained by statute or not at all. Reviews of the
research literature on the sentencing emphasize the variability among judges
and variability of sentences for similar offenses (Adler and Riedel, 1968;
Riedel and Adler, 1969; Green, 1961). Many of the studies reviewed also
indicated arbitrariness and discrimination in sentencing.
In objecting to what he regards as nearly unbounded discretion, Frankel
(1972) has indicated that there is relatively little agreement among sen-
tencers as to what the relevant criteria for sentencing are or should be.
There are, he suggests, "curbstone notions" such as seriousness of the offense
or prior record which are meant to serve as guidelines, but the unequal sen-
tences for similar offenses and offenders suggests little consensus about
these guidelines. Ac!_
If there are similar concerns about the exercise of sentencing dis-
cretion for death penalty and non-death penalty cases, it is reasonable
to suppose that the outcome of litigation with regard to the death penalty
will have an impact on policy and possibly the direction of litigation
regarding sentencing discretion for other offenses. In concluding his
comments about sentencing and the Furman decision, Frankel states:
I repeat my intention to resist speculation in the field of
constitutional law. Reluctantly turning from the capital
punishment decision, I merely register the view that the
central point about whimsical and unequal sentencing is in
principle germane in non-capital cases. This could mean
one day that the Supreme Court might deem itself constrained
finally to move more broadly, on constitutional grounds,
against the kinds of "wanton and freakish" disparities I (and
so many others) have deplored (Frankel, 1972:104).
"MANDATORY" AND "GUIDED DISCRETION" AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
As important as the Furman decision may be in a possible reevaluation
of sentencing discretion, its major impact may be a consequence of sub-
sequent legislation of mandatory and guided discretion death penalty
statutes. In that context, death penalty statutes raise questions about
the exercise of discretion throughout the criminal justice process.
As noted earlier, the legislation of mandatory and guided discretion
statutes represented an effort to remove the arbitrariness and discrimi-
nation which were constitutionally objectionable. However, the criminal
justice process from arrest to final disposition involves a series of
interdependent decisions; variations in decisions about the number and
type of offenders at one point constrains and limits the number of choices
available for decisions at other points. Eliminating or reducing discretion
at the sentencing stage can simply serve to shift the locus of discretion
to other decision points, where it produces either arbitrary or discrimi-
natory results.
There is relatively little evidence available to indicate what effect
mandatory death sentences have on pre-sentence and post-sentence decisions.
Comparing the processing of capital cases during a period of mandatory
sentencing and a period of discretionary sentencing, Bedau (1964, 1965)
found that mandatory sentences in Oregon and New Jersey are associated with
lower conviction rates and higher rates of commutation. Similarly, Riedel
(1973) found in Pennsylvania that mandatory sentences were more frequently
commuted than discretionary sentences. In addition, the results indicated
that under mandatory sentences, more black and black felony offenders were
executed (Riedel, 1973). As for the guided discretion statutes, they are
without precedent and we know nothing about their operation.
Black (1974) also concludes that eliminating or reducing discretion at
the sentencing stage shifts the locus of discretion to stages which are at
least as mistake prone and "saturated" with standardless discretion as pre-
Furman sentencing practices. Beginning with decisions to charge, a clearly
discretionary and largely unbounded decision, the prosecuting attorney may
decide the offense in question does not warrant the mandatory death penalty
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and charge a lesser offense. For example, if a mandatory death penalty is
imposed for "recklessly" causing the death of a law enforcement officer,
would it require an elaborate hypothetical argument to show that the kill-
ing, not by intention, but "recklessly", might occur in a way that it would
be absurd, as well as cruel, to execute the "reckless" offender? It would
seem inevitable, Black (1974) suggests, that prosecutors use some common
sense in charging. "Common sense", laudable though it may be in an indi-
vidual case, is subject to no rule of law, but is exercised arbitrarily.
At the conclusion of the charging process, the next step is frequently
a plea bargaining session between the prosecutor, the defendant and the
defendant's lawyer. At this stage, the defendant is given a choice to
plead guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for not insisting on a trial.
Such prosecutorial discretion is not subject to any statable rule but is a
critical official choice which can lead to the defendant being tried and
convicted for an offense carrying a mandatory death penalty.
Black (1974) also examines other discretionary decisions: the decision
as to the degree of guilt, the decision on sentencing and the decision on
clemency. Because of mandatory sentences, critical decisions as to who will
be selected for execution are made at pre-sentence and post-sentence stages
where discretion is unbounded, mistake prone, and standardless (Black, 1974).
What the preceding suggests is that mandatory sentencing makes it im-
possible to consider the consequences of death penalty sentencing from the
viewpoint of one type of decision; discretion is important as a system
property involving the interdependence of discretionary decisions. If
mandatory sentencing leads to arbitrariness and discrimination then liti-
gation resulting in more equitable death penalty sentencing must involve
changes in the pattern of discretionary decision making at pre-sentence
and post-sentence stages. Where the latter occurs, it is reasonable to
suppose that it could have a marked effect on the way discretionary de-
cisions can be made about non-capital cases.
The contention that changes in pre-sentence and post-sentence discretion
in processing death penalty offenses is further supported by the critical
view currently taken of discretion. The report of the American Friends
Service Committee (1971) could find no positive function for discretion in
criminal justice and recommended that it be eliminated or greatly reduced.
Numerous studies of police discretion (Skolnick, 1966; Reiss, 1971; Wilson,
1972), prosecutorial discretion (Grosman, 1969; Newman, 1966), and clemency
(Wolfgang, Kelley, Nolde, 1962) have found that discretionary decisions
follow no statable rule of law and are frequently arbitrary and discriminatory.
Packer (1968:290) noted:
The basic trouble with discretion is simply that it is law-
less, in the literal sense of that term. If police and pro-
secutors find themselves free (or compelled) to pick or choose
among known or knowable instances of criminal conduct, they
are making a judgement which in a society based on law should
be made only by those to whom the making of law is entrusted.
For the rough approximation of community values that emerges
from the legislative process there is substituted the personal
and often idiosyncratic values of the law enforcer.
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CONCLUSIONS
This analysis of the implications of the Furman decision criminal
justice leads to two alternatives. Supposing that subsequent litigation
on the death penalty leaves the current interpretation of the Furman
decision largely unchanged: standardless discretion exercised in im-
posing the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible. Minimally,
this result should stimulate a consideration of guidelines regarding
sentencing discretion in non-capital cases. If what is at issue is the
criteria by which sentencing decisions are made, death penalty and non-
death penalty cases are subject to the same criticisms.
Alternatively, suppose that litigation leads to changes in death
penalty sentencing in a way which reduces, constrains or eliminates
pre-sentence and post-sentence discretion. Given the present climate
of skepticism about the uses of discretion, it is difficult to under-
stand how such a result in death penalty litigation would not provide
a basis for challenging present implicit and subjective approaches to
sentence and post-sentence discretion for non-capital offenses. Either
alternative in the area of death penalty litigation provides a basis
for demanding far reaching changes in discretionary decision making in
criminal justice.
Of course, one way to avoid the consequences of either alternative
is to consider the death penalty a "unique" sanction in that it is
irreversible. Under that assumption, abolition may be the appropriate
decision because the machinery of the state for condemning and executing
men may be so fallible that whatever procedures are instituted for avoid-
ing mistakes, they are altogether insufficient.
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